How much has actually changed in the real estate community since 9/11 in regards to emergency preparedness? The answer, shockingly enough, is very little. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on security measures, from barriers to x-ray machines to turn styles to card readers to cameras to extra guards. The one thing all these items have in common is that they are preventive measures.
Yet, what happens if a disaster in your building happens anyway, despite all the attempts to prevent it? Or, what if a terrorist attack occurs in the building next door and, in a cascading effect, impacts all the buildings surrounding the target building, including yours? Or, what if an entire CBD is affected by a major event which impacts every building in the downtown core?
All the security layers put into place go right out the window and in some cases, may even compound the situation (such as turn styles inhibiting the flow of occupants during a rapid, full building evacuation). Are American and Canadian cities truly prepared for the next terrorist attack? And it will come. I believe the answer is clearly no. A mind-numbing amount of money has been spent on trying to prevent an attack, yet very, very little has been spent on reacting to one.
Three areas of concern – staff training, tenant training and fire department resource disaster plans – form a critical triangle. These three elements of a building’s disaster preparedness program are what will truly make or break the outcome of a significant emergency once it begins to unfold. An important point, too, is that you are far, far more likely to experience a fire in your building than a terrorist attack, and that is from where all emergency preparedness should evolve. Plans and procedures will, in turn, play out to cover all other types of fire depart ment related emergencies, including terrorism. Versatility is the key.
Diagram Critical Triangle
How many buildings have implimented advanced, technical staff training for all their engineering, security and management personnel, so they are fully trained in how to deal with a large-scale emergency both within and from outside their buildings? Are the building’s fire wardens properly trained in emergency procedures and how to orchestrate partial and full-scale building evacuations? Are they trained at what to do if they are trapped on their floors, or in their workspaces, and where alternative air sources exist if traditional sources are eliminated? Are drills conducted at least once a year to test everyone’s performance in carrying out specified assignments?
BASIC FACTS FOR FIREFIGHTERS
The emergency resource fire department pre-plan assists the responding fire chief incident commander in gaining a rapid, yet thorough assessment of the building and its systems. This should not be confused with the building’s evacuation/life safety plan, which is for the building’s occupants, not firefighters. They need a plan that is strictly dedicated for their use with information pertinent to their needs. No informa tionregarding evacuation guidelines, security measures, tenant or staff procedures should be in this plan. The chief is under too much pressure and has too little time to concentrate on anything except the basics – how to get around, how to cut things off and how to interface with the building systems.
The plan should only contain floor plans (every floor, top to bottom), riser diagrams, a structural diagram, a site plan, a collapse rescue grid and text (brief and to the point) on all building systems, utilities, hazardous materials and fire fighting tactical concerns that are specific to that property. The three tallest office buildings in Canada have adopted this program voluntarily. The owner/operators (O&Y, Bank of Nova Scotia and GWL Realty Advisors) chose to exceed the code, not just meet it.
Every building should store an extra set of drawings off site, just in case the plans in the build ing have been destroyed or are inaccessible. Emergency personnel will desperately require at least some build ing data.
EVACUATION ISSUES
There are many fallacies and flaws in most cities’ master disaster plans as they relate to terrorism. The most common flaw is the dependence on mass transit and privately owned vehicles (POVs) to accomplish an inner-city mass evacuation. Also, banking on infrastructure such as power, water, gas and communications to remain intact is another major error. The third is depending on the local fire, police and emergency services departments to have the capability of handling the situation with little or no help from outside agencies. That can be the most significant miscalculation of all.
Here is what’s likely to happen when an attack occurs:
If it is a significant mass casualty event, panic and chaos will ensue. Mass transportation will be lost – even if it isn’t damaged or destroyed, people making $10 an hour, with a family at home, are unlikely to drive a train or bus toward a major catastrophe to rescue you and your tenants. Gridlock will occur with people attempting to drive out of the CBD, disregarding traffic signals, causing accidents, abandoning vehicles etc. The local emergency responders will be rapidly overwhelmed and will begin call ing for aid from all surrounding cities.
If the event involves a large explosion or building collapse, utilities buried below the streets will likely be compromised. There will be a loss of water supply for fire fighting, a loss of power – forcing fire personnel to acquire large numbers of portable generators – a loss of land-line telephone, and probably cell phone use due to system overload or loss of equipment, eliminating the communications capability needed for coordinating all the agencies involved with the event and their respective functions. Severed gas lines will create secondary ignition and explosion hazards.
Everything that can go wrong probably will. It did at theWorld Trade Center.
Remember that only a fire department the size of New York’s could have dealt with an event of that scale. The next largest American fire department, for example, is about one-third the size. Even then, they were a little over whelmed during the first day and aid came from cities near and far.
CONTINGENCY FOR WORST CASE SCENERIO
Plan for the worst and hope for the best. Create contingency plans for the worst case scenario. Mass evacuation from a CBD chemical or dirty bomb attack may not be a wise thing to do if you’re going to be forced to leave the city on foot, which will likely be the case. Consider working with the local authorities in designating large assembly buildings such as schools and universities, convention centres, concert halls and enclosed malls and sporting facilities as temporary evacuation sites until the most immediate threat passes. Communicate these plans to your tenants so they are aware a controlled evacuation to specified sites may vastly increase their chances of survival.
Emergency responders should form mutual aid pacts with jurisdictions up to at least 40 miles away. Pre-designated secondary command posts and staging areas for responding equipment and personnel should be decided on so resources can be pulled as needed. This way, “ground zero” is not flooded with people with no assignment=ts and no ability to track them. Too many emergency responders can actually be a bad t hing and hamper the command and control of the scene. Coordinate with local utility companies as to what their disaster plans are to rapidly re-establish at least temporary phone, water and electrical service to the disaster site, and then the adjacent area.
Note that you will most likely not be allowed access to your buildings for at least the first few days after the event.
Assign one person – maybe the BOMA President – to act as a spokesperson for the local real estate industry in the capacity of liaison officer with the Emergency Incident Command Post Public Information Officer in offering vital data on your buildings and to carry crucial information concerning the crisis back to you and your tenants.
This will also allow you to convey your needs and high priority concerns to the incident commanders, as they primarily will only be focused on dealing with the disaster during the initial stages. They will not be thinking about your buildings being shut down and unmanned for possibly days on end. The financial repercussions of the disaster will not be a major concern to them at first, only incident control and life safety issues.
Yet, if you can at least get your engineers cleared through the security perimeter to secure your buildings (in safety zones, of course) and monitor basic functions that may exist, this can dramatically affect your losses. Create communication links with both your tenant representatives and managers of surrounding buildings to reassemble at pre-designated suburban settings (such as a high school parking lot) after evacuation is accomplished in order to determine accurate head counts and courses of action necessary to recover from the catastrophe.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 were worse than we had ever imagined. The next one may be even worse than that. Terrorism will not go away anytime soon. The key to survival is emergency training and pre-planning. Embracing components of emergency preparedness and the components of the critical triangle offer us hope for an uncertain future.
Curtis Massey is the principal of Massey Enterprises, designer of the Massey Disaster Plans that protect many of the highest-profile buildings in North America. He and his company personnel assisted with the search and rescue operationsat the World TradeCenter from September 11 through to September 21 , 2001. Curtis contributed a story co the November 1998 issue of Canadian Property Management that predicted an impending major-scale tenorist attack in a North American city.