One month after 9/11, I took a great deal of time and closely studied the operation at the World Trade Center incident. I paid considerable attention to the tremendous burden placed on the firefighters who had to climb up the stairs of two buildings that were 110 stories — about 1,350 feet — tall to attempt the rescue of scores of trapped occupants. I considered how daunting the challenge is, physically and mentally, to climb buildings the height of the twin towers, the Empire State Building, the Sears Tower, the John Hancock Center and many other skyscrapers that are over 70 stories tall. Once a building rises beyond 60 stories, it begins to exceed the ability of the fire department to reach people on upper floors. This is particularly true of firefighters wearing heavy structural turnout gear and carrying heavy, cumbersome equipment. Aside from the basic protection from heat that the gear affords, I wondered why it is done that way.
It is not reasonable for architects and developers to continue to erect tall buildings when firefighters may not be able to reach the top. I thought of big-city departments such as Los Angeles and San Diego that provide firefighters with two sets of turnout gear, one set for structural firefighting and one set for brushfires; the latter lets them initiate a sustained fire attack without dropping from exhaustion and dehydration while wearing structural gear. They match the gear to the task and it works.
In October 2001, I reached out to many big-city fire departments in the U.S. and Canada with a concept I created that I felt had some merit. I explained that all this idea really amounts to is a variation of a rapid intervention team, except it is geared toward rescuing trapped civilians instead of firefighters.
The concept may evolve where a fire department with a large concentration of high-rise buildings implements a specialized squad of four to six firefighters as a high-rise unit, or “rapid ascent team,” whose sole purpose is to arrive on scene and make a rapid ascent to the upper floors of tall buildings. Other responding multiple-alarm units can plug-in as relief or support rapid ascent teams.
The initial unit would consist of personnel in top physical condition, wearing lightweight Nomex non-structural firefighting clothing and running shoes, along with lightweight 60-minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and helmets clipped to their light coats. They would carry only basic forcible entry tools and radios and a few spare bottles, but with each member always keeping one hand free. The team’s only assignment would be to gain access to upper floors and give a “size-up” of all critical conditions to the lobby commander from within the core, in addition to providing direction to fleeing occupants, especially redirecting tenants out of the “attack” stairwell.
If elevators are operational, one team would take a high-rise bank car to the top of the building (if that bank does not serve the fire floor/blind shaft) and begin dropping down both stairwells carrying out their assignments in two-member split companies. Members of another team would take a car two floors below the fire, split up and begin working their way up both stairs performing their duties and meeting up with the other crews coming down at some point, then continuing on or reversing roles, doubling back on covered floors. If elevators are out, the teams would begin their ascent from the ground floor.
Members of a rapid ascent team would also be trained as at least EMTs, so they could provide basic medical assistance on upper stories where feasible. With their forcible entry tools, they could possibly clear a path through debris/core walls for trapped occupants above them if stair shafts are compromised. If the team’s services are not needed at the top of the building, it could carry out the assignment of splitting into two crews and descend the stairs, unlocking doors with master keys and blocking the keepers at each level to allow re-entry. The team would still maintain the door seal using inexpensive plastic blank “key cards” with double-adhesive-backing tape carried in small satchels to block the keepers.
Although budget constraints may preclude the idea from becoming a reality with some departments, it isn’t an unattainable goal, especially if existing units are tapped and refined. Homeland Defense funding for it may even be available, since it can be argued that the unit(s) would be needed to respond to a terrorist attack in skyscrapers. The idea could pay huge dividends on “the big one.”
Proven in battle: In October 2002, six civilians lost their lives in a downtown Chicago government office building. They were trapped 10 floors above the fire and perished in the fire attack stairwell before firefighters could reach them. Shortly after experiencing this devastating fire, the Chicago Fire Department made sweeping changes in its approach to high-use operations. The following year, I was honored to have been invited to teach my class on the topic to all of the department’s field chief officers, in addition to assisting them in rewriting their high-rise standard operating procedures (SOPs). As part of both my class and my recommendations relative to SOP changes, I proposed the adoption of my rapid ascent team concept. It was decided by then-Commissioner Cortez Trotter and his senior staff that it would be a viable idea to pursue. It was quickly written into the department’s SOPs and crews briefed and trained in the new role.
The courageous decision to become the first fire department in the world to adopt it proved insightful, as four months later it was met with the overwhelming challenge of fighting a five-alarm fire in a fully occupied 45-story office building where over 100 people were above the fire floor on arrival in need of rescue. The 29th floor quickly became fully involved, as heavy smoke extended to all the floors above. The incident commander immediately sent several rapid ascent teams up into the tower and successfully rescued all affected occupants, with no fatalities. No civilians or firefighters were lost and the fire was contained mostly to the floor of origin. It was a textbook fire that was as well handled as any serious high-rise fire in U.S. history and proved that the rapid ascent team now has a place in modern high-rise firefighting tactics and strategy.
The future: We all know what a tremendous task it is for firefighters to climb tall buildings wearing full structural firefighting gear (and fire helmets on their heads, further compounding the inability of the body to release heat, as well as heavy boots that are obviously not intended for climbing). Combine that with heavy equipment and the assignments become even more daunting. With buildings ascending to greater and greater heights, the strain on fire resources may be unbearable. Some firefighters attempting to reach upper floors of the World Trade Center on 9/11 collapsed from exhaustion due to the demands of climbing such tall buildings.
It is simply not reasonable to expect firefighters to overcome a nearly impossible challenge. Consider the new towers being built or now completed in cities such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur, Taipei and Dubai. The city of Dubai has begun construction of what will be the world’s tallest building (see photo) — nearly a half-mile high! How many of you believe that the city’s fire department will have any chance of reaching the upper stories if a catastrophe occurs and the elevators are lost, forcing the firefighters to ascend from the ground floor?
We must reign in the people who erect these buildings and reason with them that safety should be the primary determining criteria for high-rise construction, not ego or prestige. We must also reconsider our current methodology in high-rise operations and make a determination whether changes, such as a rapid ascent team, could increase our chances of success in future incidents in these tall buildings.